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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 24, 1982, Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co.
(Leonhardt) filed a complaint in admiralty in the Southern District of
Georgia seeking the issuance of a summons with process of attach-
ment against the M/VPuntas Malvinas, a foreign vessel whose owner
was listed in Lloyd's Register of Shippinq as A. Bottacchi S.A. de
Navegacion (Bottacchi). Pursuant to Rule B(l) of the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (the Supplemental
Rules), which are part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 Leon-
hardt's attorney complied with the following statutory requirements
1. Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 773
F.2d 1528, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Leonhardt]. In March 1982, Bottacchi
time-chartered the M/VBarbara Leonhardt from Leonhardt. In April 1982, the ship and her
cargo were damaged as a result of Bottacchi's alleged negligence while operating under the
charter party on a voyage from St. Johns, Canada to Buenos Aires, Argentina. Upon arrival of
the vessel in Buenos Aires, Leonhardt was required to post $450,000 in favor of cargo interests
to avoid arrest of the ship. Id. at 1529.
Leonhardt filed a complaint in admiralty against Bottacchi alleging that it was entitled to
either indemnity or contribution from Bottacchi for any damages that it might be adjudged to
owe. The following day Leonhardt learned that Bottacchi did not own the vessel, but rather
operated under a bareboat charter. He owned certain bunkers and stores, however, and
Leonhardt amended its complaint to pray for the issuance of service of process of attachment
against those bunkers and stores. Id. at 1529-30. The district court was particular to mention
that the initial attachment based on the mistaken ownership demonstrated the imperfection of
Rule B(l) (prior to the 1985 amendments) under the strictures of procedural due process.
Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 552 F. Supp.
771, 773 (S.D. Ga. 1982). For a discussion of the mistaken seizure of property in this case, see
Schwartz, Due Process and Traditional Admiralty Arrest and Attachment Under the
Supplemental Rules, 8 MAR. LAW. 229, 244-46 (1983).
2. Leonhardt's attorney verified the complaint in compliance with Supplemental Rule
B(l) as it read at the time the suit was initiated. The Rule was subsequently amended effective
August 1, 1985. See AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, H.R.
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for attaching a defendant's property. The attorney verified the com-
plaint on behalf of Leonhardt because none of Leonhardt's officers
were present in the district, and he submitted an affidavit stating that
to the best of his belief Bottacchi could not be found within the dis-
trict for the purpose of service of process.3
In response to Leonhardt's request to initiate process, the United
States Marshal informed the vessel's local husbanding agent of the
impending seizure of the vessel.' The local agent contacted Bot-
tacchi's attorney who, pursuant to Rule E(5), petitioned for an imme-
diate release of the property after posting security in the form of a
Doc. No. 99-63, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-13 (1985). Prior to the 1985 amendment,
Supplemental Rule B(l) read:
(1) When Available; Complaint, Affidavit and Process. With respect to any
admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified complaint may contain a
prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chattels, or credits and
effects in the hands of garnishees named in the complaint to the amount sued for,
if the defendant shall not be found within the district. Such a complaint shall be
accompanied by an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the
affiant's knowledge, or to the best of his information and belief, the defendant
cannot be found within the district. When a verified complaint is supported by
such an affidavit the clerk shall forthwith issue and summons and process of
attachment and garnishment. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff may,
pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by state law for attachment
and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for Rule
E(8) these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so invoked.
FED. R. Civ. P. Sup. B(l), 28 U.S.C. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims (1982). The Rule now reads:
1) WHEN AVAILABLE; COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, JUDICIAL
AUTHORIZATION, AND PROCESS. With respect to any admiralty or mari-
time claim in personam a verified complaint may contain a prayer for process to
attach the defendant's goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of
garnishees to be named in the process to the amount sued for, if the defendant
shall not be found within the district. Such a complaint shall be accompanied by
an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge,
or to the best of his information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within
the district. The verified complaint and affidavit shall be reviewed by the court
and, if the conditions set forth in this rule appear to exist, an order so stating and
authorizing process of attachment and garnishment shall issue. Supplemental pro-
cess enforcing the court's order may be issued by the clerk upon application without
further order of the court. If the plaintiff or his attorney certifies that exigent
circumstances make review by the court impracticable, the clerk shall issue a sum-
mons and process of attachment and garnishment and the plaintiff shall have the
burden on a post-attachment hearing under Rule E(4)(1) to show that exigent cir-
cumstances existed. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff may, pursuant
to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by state law for attachment and gar-
nishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for Rule E(8)
these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so invoked.
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 99-63, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1985) (emphasis added to show where the rule was amended).
3. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1530.
4. Id.
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bond for Leonhardt's claim.'
The district court, following an immediate postattachment hear-
ing,6 held that although Supplemental Rule B(1) was consistent with
due process "as applied" because Bottacchi received preseizure notice
of the impending hearing,7 it nevertheless violated procedural due
process under the fifth amendment.' The district court found that
Rule B(1) was facially unconstitutional because it lacked procedural
safeguards in place of preseizure notice and hearing and prompt post-
attachment hearing.9  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 10 The court held that it was unnecessary for the district
court to have reached the issue of the constitutionality of Rule B(1)
because Bottacchi had received both preseizure notice and a prompt
postseizure hearing; thus, the district court had accorded it due pro-
cess. " The court granted a rehearing en banc 2 to address the confu-
sion 1 3 in the district courts over the relationship between the federal
5. Supplemental Rule E(5)(a) provides for the release of property by order of the court or
clerk upon giving security in the form of a "special bond." FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. E(5)(a).
6. The hearing was held on May 26, 1982. Bottacchi argued that Supplemental Rule B(l)
violated his procedural due process rights under the fifth amendment because it failed to
provide adequate judicial supervision. In addition, he argued that because the rule was the
sole authority for the issuance of the writ, the writ should be quashed. The court eventually
found that since Bottacchi had both preseizure notice and an immediate postseizure hearing,
he had been accorded due process. Despite this finding, however, the court held that
Supplemental Rule B(1) was invalid under the Due Process Clause. Leonhardt, 552 F. Supp.
at 784.
7. Id. at 773-74.
8. Id.
9. In determining the unconstitutionality of the Rule, the court cited the Sniadach-
Fuentes line of cases: Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); North Georgia
Finishing v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
The court also noted that there were no local rules of court to supplement Rule B(I) so as
to afford defendants a prompt postseizure hearing and thus, adequate due process protection
under the Constitution. 552 F. Supp. at 784.
10. 732 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
11. Id. at 1549.
12. 773 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985).
13. There has been much controversy over the constitutional validity of Supplemental
Rule B(l) and accordingly, the courts' power to grant writs of attachment. Specifically, some
courts have held Supplemental Rule B(l) unconstitutional. If a court finds that the
Supplemental Rule is the sole source of authority for granting a writ of attachment, then once
the rule is declared invalid, the power to grant the writ is lost. See, e.g., Crysen Shipping Co.
v. Bona Shipping Co., 553 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Cooper Shipping Co. v. Century 21
Exposition, 1983 A.M.C. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian
Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978) (all holding Rule B(1) violates
fifth amendment procedural due process). Cf Parcel Tankers, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp.,
569 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (The procedural due process requirements necessary before
a deprivation of property takes place in a nonmaritime action are not also necessary before
attachment occurs under Rule B(l).). But see Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743
1986]
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courts' inherent admiralty powers and the powers granted to them by
the Supplemental Rules." On rehearing, 5 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court had authority to issue the writ of attachment
under the Court's inherent power to apply maritime law.16 The court
then analyzed the district court's procedures and determined they
were in accord with fifth amendment procedural due process.
17
This note will first examine the relationship between the constitu-
tional grant of authority to the federal courts to apply maritime and
admiralty law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular,
the Supplemental Rules. Then it will discuss the constitutional chal-
lenge to Supplemental Rule B(1) and the solutions offered by the 1985
Amendments. Finally, the note will analyze the detrimental effect on
any of the Supplemental Rules which Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leon-
hardt & Co v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion could have. Leonhardt
F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding Rule B(l) does not violate due process).
14. The Eleventh Circuit engaged in an elaborate analysis of the federal courts' inherent
powers to apply traditional maritime law. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing
Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1531-33).
15. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1533. Circuit Judge Johnson wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Circuit Judge Vance joined. Judge Johnson argued that Rule B(1) violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment because it did not at least require a prompt postseizure
hearing. Id. at 1541.
16. Id. at 1539.
17. Id. The Eleventh Circuit actually stated that the procedures were "entirely consistent
with Rule B(l)" but it was referring to Rule B(l) as it existed prior to amendment. Id. at
1533. This is an erroneous finding since the Supplemental Rules had been amended on April
30, 1985, and became effective on August 1, 1985, which was prior to the date of the rehearing.
The rules took effect ninety days subsequent to their being submitted to Congress without any
legislative action taken. For the text of the old and the amended rule, see supra note 2.
Although the requirement of a postseizure hearing was not in force at the time the case
was in the district court, a postseizure hearing was nonetheless held. After the appeal was
filed, the Rule was amended to require such a postseizure hearing. The Eleventh Circuit
mistakenly believed the rule was still in the process of being amended at the time the decision
on rehearing was written. See 773 F.2d at 1538 n.29.
Rule B(l), as amended, was designed to provide safeguards against violations of
procedural due process. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. The procedures the
district court followed were entirely consistent with the requirements of Rule B(l) as amended
because not only did Bottacchi receive preseizure notice, he was also afforded an immediate
postattachment hearing. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Since the prior Rule
B(l) was no longer in effect when the Eleventh Circuit heard Leonhardt's appeal, the court
was conducting a futile exercise when it called upon its inherent maritime powers to avoid
ruling on the constitutionality of prior Rule B(l).
The court would never have addressed the constitutionality of the prior rule had it known
the rule had already been amended. For this reason, Leonhardt is a weak precedent for future
litigants who wish to rely on Leonhardt for the proposition that maritime courts are free to
invoke their "inherent power" to apply maritime law in circumvention of the Supplemental
Rules. This obviously conflicts with the very purpose of the Supplemental Rules, which is to
simplify and make understandable the practice of admiralty law. See infra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
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threatens the Supplemental Rules. The majority reasoned that "dis-
trict courts are free either to follow or to disregard the Rules,"' 8 and
could elect to resort to their "inherent power to apply traditional mar-
itime law."' 9
II. TRADITIONAL MARITIME LAW AND THE ADMIRALTY RULES
The Constitution of the United States extends federal judicial
power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."2 This
constitutional grant of jurisdiction21 presupposed that American juris-
prudence would accept maritime law as it existed before the adoption
of the Constitution.22 The Constitution additionally provides Con-
gress with the power 21 "to revise and supplement the maritime law
within the limits of the Constitution. ' 24 Thus, the Constitution gives
the federal courts broad jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime
cases and Congress broad power to revise and supplement the admi-
18. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1540.
19. Id. at 1533.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This grant of federal judicial power in admiralty and
maritime cases is vested in the "supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. See generally 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATrERS
§§ 3671-3778 (1985) (broadly discussing admiralty jurisdiction and its history); I E. JHIRAD,
A. SANN & B. CHASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 109 (7th ed. 1985) (discussing the
legislative power of Congress as it relates to admiralty jurisdiction).
21. Congress first implemented this constitutional grant in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act
of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77, revised by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 79, 63 Stat. 101 (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)).
22. In Panama R.R. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court discussed precisely the issue of
whether prior maritime law was superseded by the Constitution: "After the Constitution went
into effect, the substantive [admiralty and maritime] law theretofore in force was not regarded
as superseded or as being only the law of the several states, but as having become the law of the
United States .... " 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (citing
Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)); see also O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943); Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 47 (2d ed. 1975) (analyzing the substantive law in admiralty cases in the context
of history).
In Detroit Trust Co. v. Barlum, furthermore, the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he existing
maritime law [at the time the Constitution was implemented] became the law of the United
States 'subject to power in Congress to modify or supplement it as experience or changing
conditions might require.'" 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934) (quotinq Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375, 386 (1924)).
In Leonhardt, after a similar analysis of the statutory source of maritime law, Judge
Tjoflat concluded that "[Qederal courts ... are empowered to apply maritime procedure and
law as it existed at the time of the Constitution's adoption, with such modifications as
changing needs and circumstances require, subject to congressional alteration of that law."
773 F.2d at 1532 (citations omitted).
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ralty and maritime law. In formulating the Process Act of 1792,25
Congress exercised its power by directing the courts to use "forms
and modes of proceeding [consistent with] principals, rules and
usages, which belong to courts of admiralty, as contradistinguished
from courts at common law."' 26 Accordingly, as early as 1792, Con-
gress sanctioned the use of a set of procedural rules in admiralty cases
which differed from those used in other actions.
The Supreme Court, pursuant to Congressional authorization,27
adopted the first set of maritime rules in 184228 "to assure uniformity
in only the most general features of practice and to resolve a few con-
flicts between districts .... ,'29 The Admiralty Rules of 1920, a set of
uniform but intricate rules for all federal courts to follow, superseded
these rules.3 0 Under these rules, federal courts conducted in separate
civil actions suits at law, in equity, and in admiralty.3' Chief Justice
Taft advocated for their unification as early as 1921.32 It was not until
1966, however, that the Supreme Court "effectively disposed of the
fiction of an independent admiralty jurisdiction" 3 by amending the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to enable all three types of suits to
be brought in one civil action.34 At that time, Congress rescinded the
General Admiralty Rules, and admiralty and maritime claims became
grounds for invoking federal question jurisdiction. Most of the anti-
quated nomenclature and forms of pleading formerly associated with
admiralty actions became obsolete. 5
Unification had several desireable effects, which included ensur-
25. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276.
26. Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 487 (1825) (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch.
36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276). The history of admiralty law is in the civil law. The Process Act of 1789
therefore directed the courts to apply civil rather than common law. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch.
21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 24, at § 1-3 (discussing the
ancient civil law roots of admiralty and maritime law).
27. Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)).
28. See Wiswall, Admiralty: Procedure Unification in Retrospect and Prospect, 35
BROOKLYN L. REV. 36 (1968).
29. Id. at 39. For a text of the 1842 Rules, see E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY: ITS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 425 (4th ed. 1910).
30. See Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed From the United States Courthouse; Or, What
Have They Done to Admiralty?, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 367, 374 (1969).
31. Id.
32. See Colby, Admiralty Unification, 54 GEO. L.J. 1258, 1258 (1966); Taft, Three
Hundred Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A. J. 34 (1922).
33. Crutcher, supra note 30, at 374.
34. For the text of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325 (1964).
35. See generally Crutcher, supra note 30, at 374-75 (discussing how the Supplemental
Rules reformed admiralty and maritime causes of action).
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ing "more certainty and simplicity to admiralty practice"3 6 and estab-
lishing "effective law administration."37 After unification, lawyers
unfamiliar with admiralty law could more competently bring actions
without fear of facing the independent and unfamiliar admiralty side
of the court.38 As one scholar stated, "[t]he mystery engendered by
separatism makes the nonspecialist judge and attorney even more
likely to err."3 9 Since unification, plaintiffs have brought admiralty
and maritime claims in the district courts in which the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure govern, as in any other civil action. In addition to
the Federal Rules, the Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure for Cer-
tain Admiralty and Maritime Claims govern these actions.
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL RULES
The Supplemental Rules preserved certain maritime remedies
which derive from traditional maritime law, and have no counterpart
in the common law.' They provide a series of procedures concerning
the granting of these remedies:
Remedies which had no equivalent in common law or equity, such
as arrest in rem, foreign attachment, partition, limitation of liabil-
ity, were preserved by new Supplemental Rules, but even in those
Rules a new nomenculture appeared, and the procedure for invok-
36. Colby, supra note 32, at 1275.
37. Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules: Why and How, 17 ME. L. REV. 1,
14 (1965). See Colby, supra note 32, at 1259 ("The goal [of unification] was not total a priori
uniformity, but a single simplified set of rules to dispose of most of the practical problems of
procedure in both civil and admiralty cases in a uniform way.").
38. See Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1627, 1693-94 (1976).
39. See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Upon
proposing unification, the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules stated:
To the extent that admiralty procedure differs from civil procedure, it is a
mystery to most trial and appellate judges, and to the nonspecialist lawyer who
finds himself-sometimes to his surprise-involved in a case cognizable only on
the admiralty "side" of the court. "Admiralty practice," said Mr. Justice
Jackson, "is a unique system of substantive law and procedure with which
members of this Court are singularly deficient in experience." The comment
applies generally to all levels of the judiciary. The distinctiveness of substantive
maritime law is a matter beyond the competence of this Committee, even if we
were disposed to concern ourselves with it, indeed, it is probably too much to
hope that we can ever be spared the necessity of more or less recondite bodies of
substantive law, whether they relate to maritime affairs, or patents, or copyrights,
or combinations in restraint of trade. It is multiplying the burden of the bench
and bar, however, to require mastery of unnecessarily distinctive systems of
practice and procedure.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, Proposed by the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules, 34 F.R.D. 325,
333-34 (1964) (citations omitted).
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. A advisory committee note.
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ing the remedies was subject to the general Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the extent they were not inconsistent with the
Supplemental Rules.41
According to the advisory committee note which accompanies
Supplemental Rule A, the Supplemental Rules are not a complete and
self-contained code governing these distinctively maritime remedies.42
They provide procedures which govern the granting of the remedies,
but are malleable to the extent that they remain consistent with his-
torical maritime law:
The more limited objective is to carry forward the relevant provi-
sions of the former Rules of Practice for Admiralty and Maritime
Cases, modernized and revised to some extent but still in the con-
text of history and precedent. Accordingly, these Rules are not to
be construed as limiting or impairing the traditional power of a
district court, exercising the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
to adapt its procedures and its remedies in the individual case, con-
sistently with these rules, to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action.43
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted this language to mean that
"these [Supplemental Rules] were not to be the exclusive source of
maritime procedure available to the courts."" In its analysis, the
court moved onto very dangerous grounds. It condoned ignoring the
Supplemental Rules altogether by stating that they were only one
source of law applicable in admiralty and maritime claims. Regardless
of whether the Supplemental Rules directly addressed the remedy
sought, the courts could choose not to apply them, but instead to
apply traditional maritime law.45 This is contrary to the apparent
intent of the framers of the Supplemental Rules.
Supplemental Rule A specifically provides that the Supplemental
Rules apply to the procedure in admiralty and maritime claims with
respect to only maritime attachment and garnishment, actions in rem,
possessory, petitory and partition actions, and actions concerning
41. Crutcher, supra note 30, at 374-75.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. A advisory committee note.
43. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the former rules as they relate to the
Supplemental Rules, see Robertson, supra note 38.
44. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1533.
45. For a discussion of the court's equitable powers in admiralty and maritime law, see
Wiswall, supra note 28, at 40-41, and Robertson, supra note 38, at 1637-45.
Professor Robertson elaborates upon the following statement made by Judge Brown in
Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942: "The Chancellor is no longer fixed to the woolsack. He
may stride the quarter-deck of maritime jurisprudence and, in the role of admiralty judge,
dispense, as would his landlocked brother, that which equity and good conscience impels." Id.
at 699. See Robertson, supra note 38, at 1640.
[Vol. 40:887
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exoneration from or limitation of liability.4 6 The combined language
of the Supplemental Rules and the advisory committee notes indicates
that, with respect to the admiralty remedies listed in Supplemental
Rule A, the drafters intended the Supplemental Rules to apply in toto
and to govern exclusively. Judge Johnson, dissenting in Leonhardt,
agrees:
It is apparent that the advisory committee sought to instruct dis-
trict court judges that the Supplemental Rules did not prevent
them from devising appropriate procedures to cover situations
other than the four covered by the Supplemental Rules. However,
the advisory committee note does not mean that, with respect to
actions that are covered by the Supplemental Rules, district courts
are free either to follow or to disregard the Rules, depending upon
what the situation requires.4
7
The Supreme Court addressed a similiar issue in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham48 in the context of the Death on the High Seas Act.49
The Court determined whether traditional maritime law applied
despite the existence of a federal statute which directly addressed the
matter in dispute. In addition to seeking the pecuniary damages
authorized by the federal statute, the decedent's survivors sought to
recover damages for loss of society, which were available only under
general maritime law.5 ° The Court held that the statute limited the
survivors' recovery. 1 It reasoned: "There is a basic difference
between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." '52 The Court dis-
46. Supplemental Rule A states:
These Supplemental Rules apply to the procedure in admiralty and
maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) with respect to the following
remedies:
(1) Maritime attachment and garnishment;
(2) Actions in rem,
(3) Possessory, petitory, and partition actions;
(4) Actions for exoneration from or limitation of liability.
FED. R. Civ. R. Supp. A.
47. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1540 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
48. 436 U.S. 618, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978).
49. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982).
The Death on the High Seas Act must be distinguished from the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Congress enacted the High Seas Act while the
Supreme Court promulgated the Supplemental Rules which were then ratified by Congress.
Congress, by legislative fiat, granted the judiciary the authority to draft these rules. For a
detailed discussion of the process involved in promulgating the Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1001-1008 (1969); see
Spaniol, Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 A.B.A.J. 1645 (1983).
50. 436 U.S. at 619.
51. Id. at 626.
52. Id. at 625. See generally Sea-land Serv. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (recovery
1986]
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tinguished an earlier case53 where Congress did not specifically ad-
dress by statute a given cause of action or remedy. In that case, the
Court permitted application of the general maritime law.54
The court in Leonhardt should have applied the same reasoning
to the Supplemental Rules. When the Supreme Court promulgated
the Rules, it listed only certain remedies. Once Congress ratified the
Rules,55 the Rules excluded any other remedies. On the other hand,
the Eleventh Circuit could have held that both the Rules and the
accompanying advisory committee notes did not make exclusive the
procedures for invoking the remedies and, therefore, the courts could
use their traditional maritime powers when adapting their procedures
in the interest of justice in a particular case.56
IV. RULE B(1) AND THE AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL RULES
The Leonhardt court cited Manro v. Almeida 57 for the proposi-
tion that "maritime attachment was a part of American jurisprudence
at the time the Constitution was adopted."5 8 Maritime attachment
was first authorized in 1845 when the Court promulgated Rule 2 in
the former Rules of Practice for Admiralty and Maritime Cases.59
available for wrongful death under general maritime law); Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (remedy available for wrongful death of a longshoreman under
general maritime law); Kozoidek v. Gearbulk, Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 513 (D. Md. 1979) (action
maintainable for loss of consortium where Congress had not passed a statute which spoke to
this issue).
53. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
54. See supra note 49. The Higginbotham court stated that "[Moragne] depended on our
conclusion that Congress withheld a statutory remedy ... in order to encourage and preserve
supplemental remedies." Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.
55. Congress has the power to ratify rules which the Supreme Court promulgates. See
supra note 48.
56. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
57. 243 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 474 (1825).
58. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1532 (citing Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473
(1825)).
The issue in Manro was whether attachment was available under the existing admiralty
law to compel the appearance of the respondent, who was located outside the jurisdiction of
the court. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 487-88. The Court stated:
Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that for a maritime trespass, even though it
savors of piracy, the person injured may have his action in personam, and compel
appearance by the process of attachment on the goods of the trespasser,
according to the forms of the civil law, as engrafted upon the admiralty practice.
And we think it indispensable to the purposes of justice, and the due exercise of
the admiralty jurisdiction, that the remedy should be applied, even in cases where
the same goods may have been attachable under the process of foreign
attachment issuing from the common-law courts.
Id. at 495-96. For a thorough discussion of Mann,, see Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v.
Canadian Transp. Agencies, 450 F. Supp. 447, 454-55 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
59. Substantively, maritime attachment remained the same from American common law
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Rule 2 provided for attachment in suits in personam where the
defendant could not be found within the district. 6° Rule 2 substan-
tively remained the same when the Admiralty Rules of 1920 overrode
the 1845 Rules.61
Supplemental Rule B(1) 62 is the direct descendant of Admiralty
Rule 2.63 The advisory committee states:
[Supplemental Rule B(1)] preserves the traditional maritime rem-
edy of attachment and garnishment, and carries forward the rele-
vant substance of Admiralty Rule 2.... The rule follows closely
the language of Admiralty Rule 2. No change is made with respect
to the property subject to attachment. No change is made in the
condition that makes the remedy available. 64
The substance remained the same, but the Court65 eliminated the anti-
quated nomenclature.6 6 Although maritime attachment had its roots
in admiralty law before the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States, 67 it became another remedy recoverable in a civil action.6  As
a result of the unification of civil and admiralty law69 and the "new
era in procedural [and substantive] due process,"70 attorneys began
as enunciated in Manro v. Almeida until it was ratified as Rule 2. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. Rule 2 provided:
In suits in personam, the mesne process may be by a simple warrant of arrest of
the person of the defendant, in the nature of a capias, or by a warrant of arrest of
the person of the defendant, with a clause therein, that if he cannot be found, to
attach his goods and chattels to the amount sued for; or if such property can not
be found, to attach his credits and effects to the amount sued for in the hands of
the garnishees named therein; or by a simple monition in the nature of a
summons to appear and answer to the suit, as the libellant shall, in his libel or
information, pray for or elect.
Reprinted in 7A J. MOORE & A. PELAEZ, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 224 (2d ed. 1983).
60. Id.
61. See Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1533.
62. See supra note 2.
63. Grand Bahama Petroleum, 450 F. Supp. at 455.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. B(l) advisory committee note.
65. See generally Crutcher, supra note 30 (discussing the changed forms of admiralty
pleadings); Robertson, supra note 38 (discussing the effect of the 1966 unification of the
admiralty and civil rules).
66. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the unification of admiralty
and civil law).
69. Id.
70. Note, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and Attachment, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1091-
92 (1978); see infra note 74 and accompanying text. Although the remedies for arrest and
attachment have been more severely attacked on procedural due process grounds, they have
also been challenged as being violative of substantive due process under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 235-36.
Judge Beeks perhaps enunciated the most poignant criticism of this due process challenge
in Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd.: "The recognized
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challenging the constitutional sufficiency of the traditional maritime
remedies.7
Leonhardt arose out of this litigious environment. 72 By its deci-
sion in Leonhardt, in 1982, the Southern District of Georgia became
one of the few courts to hold Rule B(l) violative of procedural due
process under the fifth amendment.73 To quell the controversy over
Supplemental Rule B(l), and to "eliminate doubts as to whether...
Rule [B(1)] is consistent with the principles of procedural due process
[as] enunciated by the Supreme Court" 74 in the Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.-Fuentes v. Shevin75 line of cases, the Supreme Court
adopted amendments to the Supplemental Rules.7 6 Under the amend-
autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional
viability of maritime attachment compel me to conclude that Shaffer does not reach Rule B(1)
attachment." 450 F. Supp. 447, 455 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
71. Various commentators have discussed these challenges to both Supplemental Rules B
and C extensively. See, e.g., Batiza & Partridge, The Constitutional Challenge to Maritime
Seizures, 26 Loy. L. REV. 203 (1980); Bohmann, Applicability of Shaffer to Admiralty In Rem
Jurisdiction, 53 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1978); Culp, Charting A New Course: Proposed
Amendments to the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty Arrest and Attachment, 15 J. MAR. L. &
COMMERCE 353 (1984); Goodman, The Due Process Mandate and the Constitutionality of
Admiralty Arrests and Attachments Pursuant to Supplemental Rules B and C, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1979); Hunsaker, supra note 70; McNamara, The Constitutionality of
Maritime Attachment, 12 J. MAR. L. & COMMERCE 95 (1980); Morse, The Conflict Between
the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules and Sniadach-Fuentes A Collision Course?, 3 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1 (1975); Robol, Admiralty's Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Over Alien Defendants: A
Functional Analysis, 11 J. MAR. L. & COMMERCE 395 (1979-80); Note, Maritime Attachment
and Arrest: Facing a Jurisdictional and Procedural Due Process Attack, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 153 (1978).
72. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
73. See Crysen Shipping Co. v. Bona Shipping Co., 553 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Cooper Shipping Co. v. Century 21 Exposition, 1983 A.M.C. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Grand
Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash.
1978).
74. H.R. Doc. No. 63, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985).
75. See supra note 9.
76. The advisory committee stated:
These Supreme Court decisions provide five basic criteria for a constitutional
seizure of property: (1) effective notice to persons having interests in the
property seized, (2) judicial review prior to attachment, (3) avoidance of
conclusory allegations in the complaint, (4) security posted by the plaintiff to
protect the owner of the property under attachment, and (5) a meaningful and
timely hearing after attachment.
Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement in the Proposed Amendments to the Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 374 (1983).
The amended Rules were promulgated on April 30, 1985, and became effective on August
1, 1985. The actual process by which the Supplemental Rules were amended deserves some
discussion. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted the amended Supplemental
Rules to the Supreme Court. The amended rules provided for an ex parte judicial review and
an immediate postattachment hearing in order to effect attachment under amended Supple-
mental Rules B and E. See supra note 2; infra note 79. The revisions to Rule B(l) received
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ments, which became effective on August I, 1985, 77 preseizure judicial
scrutiny is necessary under both Supplemental Rules B and C,7 and
Rule E guarantees a prompt postseizure hearing.79
V. THE DANGER TO THE AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL
RULES: Leonhardt
The Eleventh Circuit erred in Leonhardt by not realizing that
Congress had ratified the amendments to the Supplemental Rules
prior to the time of the decision.8 ° The Court discussed the amend-
ments to the Supplemental Rules"' as proposals. The Supreme Court
had drafted the amendments to Rule B(l) to satisfy the requirements
of procedural due process.8 2 They became effective August 1, 1985.83
The court of appeals' avoidance of the issue of Supplemental Rule
criticism as not being consistent with the purpose of a maritime attachment pursuant to tradi-
tional maritime law. See Culp, supra note 71.
Despite the criticism, the Supreme Court approved the changes to Rule B(1) as stated in
the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Amendments to the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. See supra note 73, at 375-76. Congress was given ninety days
to either reject, accept, or make changes to the proposed rules. See Spaniol, supra note 49. The
legislature, in fact, made no changes and took no action during the ninety days, thus the rules
were ratified as proposed, effective August 1, 1985.
77. See supra note 76.
78. See supra note 2 (language of Rule B(l)); see also Culp, supra note 71, at 378-79
(discussing preseizure judicial scrutiny under the proposed amendments to Rules B and C).
An analysis of Rule C is beyond the scope of this note.
79. In 1985, Rule E was amended to include new subsection (4)(O:
PROCEDURE FOR RELEASE FROM ARREST OR ATTACHMENT.
Whenever property is arrested or attached, any person claiming an interest in it
shall be entitled to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff shall be required to
show why the arrest or attachment should not be vacated or other relief granted
consistent with these rules. This subdivision shall have no application to suits for
seamen's wages when process is issued upon a certification of sufficient cause filed
pursuant to Title 46, U.S.C. §§ 603 and 604 or to actions by the United States for
forfeitures for violation of any statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. E(4)(f).
80. October 1, 1985. See Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de
Navegacion, 773 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985).
81. See Proposed Amendments to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 374-80 (1983).
82. For a discussion of the amended Supplemental Rules and procedural due process, see
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. WARREN E. BURGER, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE,
H.R. Doc. No. 63, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985). The rules became effective on August 1,
1985, ninety days after Congress had received the proposed rules from the Supreme Court and
had not acted upon them. See Spaniol, supra note 49. Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are remedial, amendments to the rules have been retroactively applied. See, e.g.,
Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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B(l)'s constitutionality, prior to its being amended,8 4 can be a danger-
ous precedent for the future manageability of the amended Supple-
mental Rules. In fact, Leonhardt is significant because, after
reversing the district court, 5 the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing
en banc s6 apparently, to circumvent the powerful reasoning of the
district court concerning the unconstitutionality of Supplemental
Rule B(1). 87
The court of appeals' first opinion is more sound than its decision
on rehearing. In the first opinion, the court held that because, under
the facts of the case, 8 Bottacchi "was accorded the procedural due
process to which it was entitled, the lower court erroneously pro-
ceeded to a determination of the facial constitutionality of Rule
B(1). ' '8 9  The district court's procedures in the present case were,
ironically, consistent with the amended Supplemental Rules, even
though it decided Leonhardt before their ratification. 9°
On rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit read the district court as
having dissolved the writ of attachment on the theory that because
Supplemental Rule B(1) was unconstitutional, the court lacked the
power to issue the writ. 91 The court stated that the district court92
had incorrectly viewed the Supplemental Rules as the sole authority
for a federal court to issue a writ. 93 To expand the district court's
"narrow" view of the federal courts' traditional maritime powers,94
the Eleventh Circuit on rehearing held that the district court could
have issued the writ of attachment independently of Rule B(l), under
its inherent power to apply traditional maritime law.95 This is not,
84. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The court granted the rehearing on
September 21, 1984.
87. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 389-91.
88. See supra note I and accompanying text.
89. Leonhardt, 732 F.2d at 1549.
90. See supra notes 2, 76 and accompanying text. This is of limited relevance, however,
because the original opinion was decided on May 29, 1984, over one year before Congress
ratified the amendments to the Supplemental Rules.
91. 773 F.2d at 1530 n.5. The district court held that the defendant had been accorded
due process under Rule B(1) "as applied," but held that Rule B(l) was facially
unconstitutional. Id. at 1530-31.
92. The Eleventh Circuit mentions two other cases in which a court held Rule B(l)
unconstitutional and, therefore, powerless to issue a writ of attachment. See Crysen Shipping
Co. v. Bona Shipping Co., 553 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Cooper Shipping v. Century 21
Exposition, 1983 A.M.C. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1982). Leonhardt 773 F.2d at 1531 n.6.
93. 773 F.2d at 1530-31.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. The Leonhardt court analyzed at length
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however, consistent with the purpose and function of the Supplemen-
tal Rules.
The advisory committee note applicable to Supplemental Rule A
states that, while acting under its exclusive jurisdiction to hear admi-
ralty and maritime cases, the district court may "adapt its procedures
and remedies in the individual case, consistently with these rules
.... "96 In other words, the Supplemental Rules must always apply,
but the courts may adjust the remedies and procedures so as not to
undermine the purpose of the Rules. The Eleventh Circuit gave only
lip service to the advisory committee. It said, "We view the proce-
dures employed in the present case, including the postattachment
hearing, as entirely consistent with Rule B(l)."9 7 Because the court
had already admitted its reliance on traditional maritime law and had
expressed that there was no need for reliance on the Supplemental
Rules, the statement was unnecessary verbiage.
This reasoning "trivializes"' not only Supplemental Rule B(l),
but also all of the Supplemental Rules. The Supreme Court promul-
gated an amended Supplemental Rule B(l) to satisfy due process
requirements.99 What logical relevance could there be, then, to per-
mit a court to disregard the Rules and decide instead under its "inher-
ent powers"?"° Although judicial power indisputably extends to "all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,"' 0'1 Congress has
empowered 10 2 the Supreme Court to promulgate rules to control the
procedures used in the federal courts. These rules are binding on the
federal courts.'03 In fact, Supplemental Rule A states that the "Sup-
plemental Rules apply to the procedure in admiralty and maritime
claims . . . ." The Supplemental Rules give the federal courts the
authority to invoke the special remedies provided in those rules. °5
the court's inherent power to apply traditional maritime law and the history of attachment in
American jurisprudence. 773 F.2d at 1531-33.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. A advisory committee note (emphasis added See supra notes
42-48 and accompanying text.
97. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1533. The court applied the requirements of procedural due
process as expounded in the Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases. See supra note 76.
98. Leonhardt, 773 F.2d at 1540 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
103. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1012 (1969).
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, "these rules govern the procedure in the
United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. A.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. A-E.
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The courts retain their inherent power to hear admiralty cases, 106 but
they should work under established guidelines promulgated by the
Supreme Court and ratified by Congress when awarding special mari-
time remedies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1985 amendments to the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims reflect changing times. Maritime
activity is no longer of the same economic magnitude as in the nine-
teenth century. 07 Maritime law no longer retains the traditional
unique qualities it enjoyed prior to the 1966 unification of admiralty
and civil law.' In fact, the 1966 unification was a great step in the
evolution of the maritime law. Similarly, the 1985 amendments to the
Supplemental Rules, which apply the procedural safeguards enunci-
ated in the Sniadach-Fuentes 9 line of cases to maritime seizures and
attachments, further develop maritime law. The Eleventh Circuit
court's reasoning, which encourages courts to invoke their traditional
powers in admiralty to circumvent the Supplemental Rules, poses a
serious threat to the uniformity and stability of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims.
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106. See supra note 20.
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